Firewall has been at the center of intense research in the last decade owing to the increase of malicious attacks on networks. Constant updating of the firewall configuration by modifying, adding and removing rules increases the complexity of the configuration resulting in overlapping and often conflicting filtering rules. As a consequence, the set of filtering rules becomes unreliable and contains multiple misconfigurations creating ambiguity in classification of new traffic, not only affecting the performance of the firewall, but also putting the system in a vulnerable position. Manual management of this problem can be overwhelming and potentially inaccurate. Therefore, there is a need of automated methods to analyze, detect and fix misconfigurations. The objective of our work is to propose (1) a new formal approach to discover effective firewall configurations errors, (2) an optimal and automatic method with the minimum number of operations to correct these misconfigurations in both centralized firewalls and firewalls in a distributed environment and (3) a tool that implements proposed techniques and significantly helps user in discovering and resolving firewall misconfigurations.
Introduction
The complexity of networks is constantly increasing, as it is the size and complexity of firewall configurations. These Firewalls are the first line of defense for the enterprise network, they examine the traffic of network against an ordered list of filtered rules, generally, defined by network administrator according to the global security policy. Overtime, the exponential growth in network traffic, services and applications has led to a growth in rule-sets size and a growth in firewall complexity. In a typical enterprise network, a single firewall may be configured with thousands of rules. Moreover, in multi-firewall environment, with hundreds of firewalls, it is difficult to verify detect and correct manually misconfigurations that can arise between different rules.
In our work, we consider the following problem: In a multi-firewall environment network, where each firewall can accumulate hundreds of changes over the years, how can we analyze detect and fix firewalls misconfigurations? To deal with firewall rules analysis problem, many solutions have been proposed. In [12, 11, 10] , detection algorithms presented deal only with pairwise filtering rules. In such a way, some other classes of configuration anomalies could be uncharted. In [3] , authors present a model for detecting anomalies in a small network. Authors in [7] present a formal automata-based approach to detect rules anomalies. Abbes et al. present in [1] a method that allows representing filtering rules in a tree data structure and to update it according to the evolution of the firewall configuration. Nevertheless, the drawback of these approaches [3, 7, 1, 17] is that they did not propose a method to correct automatically discovered misconfigurations. Authors in [15] use the concept of Relational Algebra and a 2D box model to identify anomalies. Also, there are research works focusing on creating automated solutions to detect configuration inconsistencies firewalls through formal verification [4] , [9] . In [5] , Gawanmeh et al. presented a formal model for firewall configuration rules based on domain restriction. This model is used to define an algorithm to formally verify the consistency of the configuration rules in firewalls. This work offers the ability to characterize firewall configurations at different levels of abstraction. In [20] authors present an anomaly identification and resolution approach their approach is similar to the work of Hu et al [13] who propose a framework that facilitates the resolution of anomalies by considering the analysis of relations between all rules in the firewall configuration. The proposed idea to resolve anomalies is based on calculating a risk level that permits users, in some cases, to manually select the appropriate strategies for resolving the conflict. In such a way, the administrator can make wrong choices. FIREMAN [19] is a static analysis toolkit to check anomalies in firewalls. It can only show there are anomalies between one filtering rule and preceding rules without identifying all rules involved in the anomaly. Adao et al. [2] propose Mignis, a declarative policy language to specify a Linux firewall, Netfilter configurations.
Some other approaches take into account the requirements of the security policy and try to verify the firewall configuration with the security policy. For example, Matsumoto and Bouhoula [18] propose a SAT based approach to verify firewall configurations with respect to the security policy. Ben Youssef and Bouhoula [16] propose a formal method for verifying automatically that a firewall configuration is conform to a security policy. But, in the case of the presence of anomalies and non-conformity with the security policy, these two methods does not propose a method to correct the detected anomalies. In this work, we propose a new approach to discover and fix misconfigurations in a multi-firewall environment. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews the formal representation of firewall configurations and security policies and details FDD structure. In section 2.4, we articulate our approach to detect and correct firewall misconfigurations and to discover and remove superfluous rules. In section 4, we present the formalism used in our work. Finally, we present our conclusions and discuss our plans for future work.
Preliminaries
In what follow, we define, formally, some key notions.
Firewall configuration
A simple firewall configuration is a finite sequence of filtering rules of the form F R = (r i ⇒ A i ) 0<i<N +1 . These rules are tried in order, up to the first matching one. A filtering rule consists of a precondition r i which is a region of the packet's space, usually, consisting of source address, destination address, protocol and destination port. Each right member A i of a rule of F R is an action defining the behavior of the firewall on filtered packets: A i ∈ {accept, deny}. The last rule of a firewall configuration is called the default policy of the firewall. In fact, each firewall implements a positive or negative policy. If it is positive, the default decision is to deny-all i.e., deny a packet when any configuration rule applies. By contrast, the negative policy will accept-all.
Security Policy
A security policy SP is presented as a finite unordered set of directives, as showed in the example of the Introduction, defining whether packets are accepted or denied. We consider also two sets, SP accept and SP deny where SP accept consists of packets accepted to pass through the set of directives SP and SP deny is the subset of denied packets. In this work we suppose that SP is consistent, i,e. SP accept ∩ SP deny = ∅.
Firewall Decision Diagram (fdd) of a simple firewall
The firewall decision diagram (fdd) as defined in [6, 8] is an acyclic and directed graph that has the following properties: There is exactly one node in fdd that has no incoming edges. This node is called the root of fdd. The nodes in fdd that have no outgoing edges are called terminal nodes. fdd is the union of direct paths dp i . The algorithm used to construct an fdd is detailed in [6, 8] . So we have: f dd = i(i:1→m) dp i . dp i = dp i .srce ∧ dp i .protocol ∧ dp i .dest ∧ dp i .port ∧ dp i .rules ∧ dp i .action.
• dp i .src is the range of source address represents by the direct path dp i .
• dp i .dst is the range of destination address represents by the direct path dp i .
• dp i .port is the range of port number represents by the direct path dp i .
• dp i .protocol is the range of protocols represented by the direct path dp i .
• dp i .rules is the set of rules from the firewall configuration that match the domain of packets represented by this direct path, dp i .rules = {r ki } (k:1→l) , where r 1i is the first rule in the firewall configuration applied on the domain of dp i . The action of this direct path is the action applied by r 1i .
• dp i .action= the action of this direct path dp i .
We define a variable called dp i .f ield which represents different fields of a direct path, where field could be (src, dst, port, protocol). Each dp i .f ield (i.e., dp i .src, dp i .dst, dp i .port, dp i .protocol) satisfies the following two conditions for each node in the firewall decision diagram:
• Consistency: dp i .f ield ∩ dp j .f ield = ∅, i = j.
• Completeness: i∈[1,n] dp i .f ield = * ( * means total field's domain since default rule is deployed in each firewall). 
FDD of a path in a distributed environment
A network path path i [src, dst] is composed by an ordered set of firewalls through which the traffic flow from the source src to the destination dst. path i = {f c j , n <= j <= m}. Let P aths be the set of all possible paths in our network. P aths = {path i , 1 <= i <= k}.
A firewall decision diagram of a path path i is constructed using the collection of rules of different firewalls f c j belonging to this path. Therefore, The firewall decision diagram of the set P aths of our network could be represented as follows: F DD(P aths) = F DD = {0<i<N +1} f dd i , where each f dd i is the firewall decision diagram of the path path i , so F DD is the union of f dd i of each path in the network. Given that the default rule is applied by each firewall each node in each f dd i satisfies the consistency and the completeness conditions. We construct f dd i by using the same algorithm depicted in 2.3 for the collection of rules of each path i . The proprieties already defined for a direct path in a simple firewall remains the same, only for sets dp i .rules and dp i .action. In fact, we have to precise for each rule the firewall that belongs to it. Therefore, we define direct path dp j ∈ f dd i as follows: dp j = dp j .srce ∧ dp j .dest ∧ dp j .port ∧ dp j .protocol ∧ dp j .rules ∧ dp j .action where dp j .rules = {r h k j } here k is the index of the each firewall through which the traffic flow in the path path i . The action of each direct path depends on the actions of each first rule handled by this direct path from each firewall in this path, so we have:
• dp j .action = accept if ∀r 1 k j ∈ dp j .rules, action(r 1 k j ) = accept.
• dp j .action = deny if ∃!r 1 k j ∈ dp j .rules, action(r 1 k j ) = deny.
Approach Overview

Discovering and removing superfluous rules
A rule is superfluous if and only if it can be removed without altering the firewall behavior if we have a simple firewall and the path configuration behavior if we are in a distributed environment. To verify if a rule is superfluous, we need to ensure that removing it from each direct path will not affect the action of this path.
Definiton : A rule is considered to be superfluous in a simple firewall, if this rule exists in the set of rules handled by a direct path then this rule is shadowed (i.e. it is not the first rule to be applied in this direct path) or redundant to the second rule in this path. Formally, A rule r i is superfluous iff ∀dp j ∈ f dd, if r i ∈ dp j .rules then r i verifies one of these two conditions :
2. r i = r 1j and action(r i ) = action(r 2j ).
To address this challenge, we use the inference system shown in Fig. 2 . The rules of this inference system are applied to three components (f c, f c f , f dd), the first component f c is the initial firewall configuration, the second component f c f is the updated version of f c by removing all superfluous rules and the third component f dd is the set of direct paths that represents relations between f c rules. Remove is the main inference rule in this inference system. It deals with each rule r i from the firewall configuration f c. Applying this inference rule implies updating the set of rules f c f by removing superfluous rules. The inference rule Stop is applied when we parse all the filtering rules of f c. Thus, we conclude that this process provides configuration optimization, which reduces the firewall rule size and subsequently improves its performance. 
Misconfigurations classification and discovering
We have two types of misconfigurations: Partial and Total misconfigurations: (TMC) A direct path DP i ∈ F DD is totally misconfigured iff the packets mapped by this path apply a different action as applied in the security policy on these packets.(PMC) A direct path DP i ∈ F DD is partially misconfigured iff some packets mapped by this path apply a different action as applied in the security policy on these packets, Formally :
TMC : A direct path DP i ∈ F DD is totally misconfigured iff ∃r mi ∈ DP i where action(r mi ) = DP i .action and all the packets mapped by this path apply a different action as applied in SP on these packets.
PMC : A direct path DP i ∈ F DD is partially misconfigured iff ∃r mi ∈ DP i where action(r mi ) = DP i .action and some packets mapped by this path apply a different action as applied in SP on these packets. Once all misconfigurations have been discovered using an inference system, we can start their correction process.
In Figure 3 we propose an inference system that presents necessary and sufficient steps to discover Total and partial misconfigurations. The rules of this inference system apply to triple (F DD, T M C, P M C). The first component F DD represents the direct paths extracted from the firewall configuration as explained in the previous section, F DD = {DP i } (i:1→n) . The second component T M C is the set of extracted Total misconfigurations and the third component P M C represents the set of partial misconfiguration. Extract TMC and Extract PMC are the main inference rules for the inference system. The first one detects Total misconfigurations. It deals with each DP i from F DD and verifies if this DP i applies totally the same action in the firewall configuration as applied in SP , so we test if this DP i is included in the set of SP !(action(r1 i )) , if it is the case, DP i is considered to be a total misconfiguration, because the action of DP i , which is equal to action(r 1i ), is different from the action applied by SP on this direct path, so we add DP i to T M C. The same for the second, Extract PMC, but here we will extract partial misconfigurations. In fact, for each DP i we test if a part from the domain of this direct path apply a different action on the packets matched by this domain as applied in SP , if it is the case we will add DP i to the set of partial misconfigurations P M C. The inference rule Pass is applied when DP i does not contain an anomaly between its rules, or when it contains an anomaly and the action applied on this direct path in F DD is same action undertaken by the security policy. So, in this case this anomaly is considered to be intentional and not a misconfiguration. Hence, the repeated application of these inference rules ensures the extraction of all misconfigurations (Partial or Total) from the firewall configuration. The rule Stop is applied when we parse all the direct paths of F DD.
Our objective is to correct each misconfiguration with the minimum number of modifications and with the minimum number of generated rules. In our approach, for each step, we try to correct a misconfiguration (total or partial). To determine which correction method should be used at each case; we test if the condition of each correction technique is verified. In fact, we parse the set of total and partial misconfigurations then we try to correct them by using one of the inference systems detailed in the next section. For total misconfigurations, we can use the delete-rule inference system, if this method could not be applied then we use the modifyaction inference system and if the condition of the last method is not verified we use the swap-rules inference system. If none of them could be applied, we apply the field-modification inference system which is also used to correct partial misconfigurations. Then after fixing all misconfigurations we generate the new set of rules using this key property:
• Each rule r k from the firewall configuration could be represented as follow: r k = i DP i where r k ∈ DP i .R 
Misconfigurations correction techniques
• Remove-rule Method : First, we try to correct Total misconfigurations by removing misconfigured rules using an inference system. We can remove a rule only if this rule exists in a decision path as a first rule, then this path is totally misconfigured and the action of second rules in these paths are different from the actions of first rules. So if we remove this rule we will correct all these misconfigurations.
• Modify rules Method : Due to the first-match semantics, modifying the action of a rule affect the semantic of the firewall. Thus, after changing the action of a rule we should not generate new misconfigurations. So, we should verify first if all the direct paths that have this rule as a first rule are totally misconfigured. If it is the case, we can change the action of the rule under consideration and using this one modification we will correct all misconfigured direct paths that have this rule as a first one.
• Swap rules Method : Changing the order of two rules by swapping them in a firewall configuration affects its functionality. Therefore, before swapping two rules, we need to test and to verify if this modification will generate new misconfigurations between one of the swapped rules and other rules. Also we should verify if this action will correct misconfigurations that exist in paths presented by these two rules.
• Field modification Method : To fix partial misconfigurations we use an inference system that allows to divide each partially misconfigured direct path DP i , into two sets, the first is the set that have the correct action as defined in the security policy. And the second DP i represents the subset of DP i that should be fixed by removing all rules having the same action as the first rule from this set DP i . So using this method we fix all partial misconfigurations.
Initial Results
In order to better assess the effectiveness of our approach, we proved formally the correctness and completeness of our inference systems. Also we implemented the techniques and inference systems in a software tool, using a Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based approach. This approach reduces the verification problem into Boolean formula and checks its satisfiability. Therefore, we have chosen the Java developing language. On the other hand, the verification of the satisfiability of Boolean expressions is performed using Limboole [14] . This tool allows to check satisfiability respectively tautology on arbitrary structural formulas and not just satisfiability for formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF), and can handle large set of non-quantified Boolean clauses in reasonably good time. Our formalism for specifying the Firewall configuration and the security policy is a Boolean-based specification language. For example, the functional mapping of precondition r i components into Boolean variables is shown below :
• We model the source and destination IP addresses with 32 Boolean variables each, namely, (s0, s1, ., s31) and (d0,d1, ..d31);
• Address ranges with masks can be reduced by bit-wise ANDing the masks with the base addresses;
• We have 32 different protocols so protocol type can be reduced using 5 variables (p0,p1...p4);
• We have 65356 different ports number, so in our formalism port numbers are mapped into 16 Boolean variables, namely (n0,...,n15).
The example shown in Figure 4 how we reduce an ip address using our formalism: 
Conclusion
The prevalent use of firewalls in network security emphasizes the importance of efficient and optimal configuration. This paper describes two problems. The first is the problem of rule-sets optimization for simple and distributed firewalls and presents our approach to configuration optimization by removing rules that are no longer needed (called superfluous). The second is firewall misconfiguration discovering and correction. While the current approach focuses on the analysis of Firewall rules, in our future work, we plan to analyze other security equipment configurations.
